

Engaging with Radicals: Do Negotiations Work?
H.E. Garret FitzGerald: former Prime Minister, Ireland

06:08	On some aspects of the rather idiosyncratic experience of Irish terrorism may have some wider relevance, although obviously much of the discussion today has rightly been concerned with international violence, al-Qaeda. And the particular problems of particular areas or experiences are interesting but are not always relevant to that wider issue. I accept that.
06:32	First of all, IRA violence, I should mention, was always more of a threat to our state than to Britain. The British state can be damaged by being blown up or people being killed, but the state would survive. In our case there was always that possibility that emotions aroused at home by errors in Northern Ireland by British security would lead to a destabilisation of <i>our</i> state.
06:57	And secondly, of course—I'll come to that—the British withdrawal from Northern Ireland would have been disastrous, and that was our major fear.
07:05	So we are really the prime target. The IRA want to establish a socialist dictatorship in lieu of an Irish democracy in Ireland. And we therefore are very much under threat.
07:20	The cause of the problem in Northern Ireland was a combination of two things. First, British neglect. Britain, having thought it had solved the Irish problem in 1921, washed its hands of it. No matter what happened in Northern Ireland or what problems of discrimination there were, they weren't going to re-engage in Ireland. And therefore discrimination was not tackled, and a whole head of steam built up, which was bound to explode at some stage.
07:44	This was aggravated by irresponsible Irish policies. Irish political parties, especially, from 1949 onwards enjoyed so much hating Britain over the partition of Ireland and how [divisive?] it was that our country was not united—it was all Britain's fault—that they inadvertently both alienated Unionists and aggravated Unionist fears and led to reactions on that side, and also had the unintended effect of encouraging violence amongst Nationalists in Northern Ireland.
08:15	British neglect and Irish irresponsibility created the crisis in Northern Ireland. The main blame lay with Britain, <i>some</i> to there, but we also shared responsibility. That has to be said, because I will have some critical things to say about British policy. And I have to say at the beginning that we also had our share in the mistakes.
08:34	When the violence broke out in Northern Ireland, Irish politicians suddenly realised that their irresponsible approaches had in fact created dangers for our own state, as instability in Northern Ireland could overflow to ours. And from about 1972 onwards a clear line of Irish policy emerged, privately: that is, to aim at achieving peace and stability in Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom until and unless at some future time, perhaps, a majority there would wish to join our state.

09:05	There was a total reversal of our policy. That was not advertised. If we advertised that and said that was the purpose of our policy, it would have, of course, strengthened the danger of the IRA. But that was the thrust of Irish policy from then on.
09:26	The second fear we had was a British withdrawal. That never appeared in public, but I was aware at the time, and took steps to deal with it, that Harold Wilson had a plan to withdraw from Northern Ireland in the extraordinary belief that he'd leave behind a peaceful little member of the Commonwealth, a new dominion. Well, we knew better, as we have to live on the island of Ireland.
09:51	In discussions with Jim Callaghan I enlisted his support, and he defeated Wilson on that subject in November 1975. I also spoke to Henry Kissinger in early '75 about our fear of British withdrawal, and he told me—he had told me before he never wanted to get involved in Ireland; his Irish-American wife told him not to!—but he agreed with me that if there were a real threat of British withdrawal, he would intervene in view of the possible threat to north-western Europe from all the countries like Cuba or Soviet Union or China, which might involve themselves in a chance to stir up trouble for Britain.
10:31	So they were our great concerns. Not advertised, not part of the public history, but crucial.
10:39	Unfortunately the British approach to Northern Ireland was dominated by security issues. The imperial heritage and the extraordinary role of the British army and British society created a problem: because until the Blair government came to power, in our estimation no British government was prepared to take the necessary action to ensure that the British army's actions in Northern Ireland did not undermine the thrust of their policy for achieving peace and stability.
10:09	That was our major concern. The problem was there was a police force that was partisan and collapsed under pressure. The only alternative security force was the army, the British Regimental Army, which hugely vary in disparate arrangements between regiments, of young people aged 17 or 18 sometimes. And there's a police force—you did not get even-handed policing and wise policing; you <i>couldn't</i> from that. That's not blaming anybody, but it was the only possible security force, and it was not a particularly useful security force.
11:43	Consequently, the British desire to achieve peace and stability in Northern Ireland was undermined by the lack of control in its own system: the Ministry of Defence and the army determined what actually happened on the ground, even when that was undermining the purpose of British policy. That was our major concern: a counterproductive security policy and the parallel failure to tackle the underlying problem of the alienation of the Nationalist minority through the failure to tackle discrimination, which was not finally tackled until the legislation in 1989, which has resolved the whole problem. But until then it wasn't dealt with. No British government reform was introduced; that issue was never fundamentally tackled.

12:30	What delayed the emergence of peace? First, the fact that British governments in the 1970s consistently maintained or arranged contacts with the IRA. Here I disagree with the majority of speakers, because in our case—I'm not generalising—in our case those contacts simply confirmed the IRA's belief that if they continued murdering people, or murdered <i>more</i> people, more effectively, Britain would eventually leave. And they had some grounds for that, in view of Harold Wilson's policy, in the matter of which I had deepest suspicions.
13:07	So that led to the violence continuing. It was only when Britain broke off contacts with the IRA after 1980 that the IRA began to, some years later, reconsider their position.
13:20	The second factor was the problem with the security forces I've mentioned.
13:26	The third factor was the memory of earlier Irish irredentism made it understandably difficult for British governments to take seriously the reversal of Irish policy. It took a long time for them to realise that our interest and theirs coincided in achieving peace and stability in Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom for the foreseeable future.
13:45	And it understandable that, after fifty years of propagandising, it wasn't easy for them to realise the penny had dropped: we'd learned from our experience, and that we and they really had the same interest. That helped themselves.
14:00	What led to the emergence of the peace process? First of all, our policy of isolating the IRA. Contrary to what's been said here, in our case, contacts with the IRA by our government—as the British had had contacts with them—would have had a very negative effect. We isolated them completely. Irish governments had no contact with the IRA. In 1971 we cut off access to television—regarded as very anti-libertarian, but in our case we thought it essential, both because, had the IRA been appearing on our television, Unionists would have seen that as us collaborating with them; it would have deeply aggravated Unionist attitudes and contributed to the Unionist Loyalist reaction, which involved the killing of many hundreds of Nationalists in Northern Ireland because of the religious differences and the kind of war they carried on.
14:53	So [our isolation?] of the IRA led them eventually—because they want the access to television; Britain had a similar policy, brought in later, but allowing actors to appear on behalf of the IRA—extraordinary idea, which didn't help. But, however, when we consistently refused to talk to them, and the British <i>stopped</i> talking to them, they then had to reconsider their position.
15:22	And that [was?] one-sided, with the gradual emergence of the fact there was a stand-off and a stalemate. The IRA couldn't, eventually in the Eighties they could see, bring down Northern Ireland; and the British Government, British army, began to understand their army was not going to solve the problem by military means. Both sides woke up to the fact a political solution was necessary.

15:48	Moreover, we were very fortunate in that the leader of the Constitutional Nationalist Party, John Hume, a man of great vision and self-sacrifice, undertook the task of mediation, of his own accord, to persuade the IRA that they ought to abandon violence and that the British Government did <i>not</i> have a colonial attitude, fundamentally, and that it would be a mistake to see them in that light.
16:14	He did that in a manner which contributed enormously to the evolution of the peace process—made it have its start in 1993, or come to the public forum in 1993—at the expense of his own party, which as a result ended up as a minority group in Northern Ireland. Not often in history has the leader of a party undertaken, for the general good, a course of action which was liable to be, and was, fatal for his own party’s role in the political system.
16:44	Finally, in the period from ’93 onwards, but particularly after ’97, the degree of British commitment, especially by Tony Blair, and the sophistication of Irish governments in developing contacts with Unionists—and undermining the Unionist fears and getting them to understand we were <i>not</i> trying to damage them in some way—the combination of the two governments acting wisely in a situation where, once the IRA showed they were willing to move for peace, <i>then</i> we could start talking to them.
17:17	The process therefore is isolate—in our case, isolate them; then mediation by somebody they could talk to and who could reason with them— <i>not</i> coming from government, no contact with that government; thirdly, low-level contacts when they looked like moving for peace—moving up to high-level contacts eventually at a political level. That was the process in our case.
17:39	It’s not a prescription for other countries. The case is a pretty unusual one. There’s no direct equivalent: because of the involvement of two governments and two communities in Northern Ireland—there’s no real equivalent elsewhere. I’m only saying what our position was and how it developed.
17:55	The intensity of Mr Blair’s commitment was enormously important, especially in his first year, when he gave up so much of his time to it.
18:03	Conclusions. A security-dominated approach is hugely counterproductive. All it does is increase support for the terrorist movement, which it did over time. And failure in our case, as so often in so many places, of governments to control their armies’ behaviour and ensure that it operates on a human rights basis and doesn’t provoke violence. That failure certainly was a problem. But a security-dominated approach is a mistake.
18:35	Isolating terrorists—well, that helped. Mediation and the application of political skills based on insights into the terrorist mindset. Empathy. The most important quality in diplomacy in dealing with another country, in dealing with terrorists, is that we need to try to understand what makes them tick.

18:57	In our case, we had an advantage: our government had emerged from a violent war — a guerrilla war vis-à-vis Britain; our Ministers were 43 years afterwards in government, where people had been through that process. Their successors learnt from them. And we <i>understood</i> the mindset: we understood the problems with hunger strikes and things like this. And we eventually persuaded the British to reconsider their policy.
19:24	The emergence in Britain of very wise Ministers like Geoffrey Howe and very wise public servants like Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, and Goodall in the Cabinet Office, led to a re-evaluation. And at the end of the day, the negotiation I had with Margaret Thatcher in underwriting an agreement, that in fact was not so much a negotiation between Ireland and Britain as one between all the rest of us and Margaret Thatcher—who was never emotionally convinced, became intellectually convinced of the need for agreement, and then emotionally resiled from it and rejected it ten years later. But the fact that she signed it was hugely important.
20:06	Because, when that agreement was signed, the immediate private reaction of the IRA —not their public reaction—was: ‘God, if FitzGerald can get that from Margaret Thatcher, we might get somewhere with a later British government towards some of our objectives and concerns for the minority here.’ So the agreement was very important in the impact it had. It led to a one-third reduction in support in elections for Sinn Féin, contributed strongly to the rethink of policy by Sinn Féin and the movement to the peace process.
20:38	It’s a very complex interaction because of two states being involved and two communities and all that, but it worked that way. But above all, empathy: a capacity to understand—and that was the theme of so much that was said here today and so wisely: the capacity to understand what makes people act the way they do, to empathise with them. Not to <i>agree</i> with them, but empathise with them and to try to act wisely, rather than unwisely, in handling conflict.
21:08	Thank you. [<i>applause</i>]
End of H.E. Garret FitzGerald’s address	

Dr Boaz Ganor: Executive Director, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

21:50	Okay, first of all, you know what's the difference between the British culture of discussion and the Israeli culture of discussion? The Israelis always to speak first: because they're afraid that somebody else will say what they wanted to say before they say it. The British always like to speak last: hopefully, somebody will say what they wanted to say, and they will be dismissed! So for me to be in the last panel of the conference is a torture! <i>[laughter]</i>
22:18	Now, having said that, two remarks. I would prefer to speak about the generic issue of negotiation with terrorists and to leave the Israeli-Palestinian question, if I'll be asked with the Q&A in reference to that. The other remark is that I definitely do not represent the Israeli Government's standpoint nor even my Institution position; it's only my responsibility and my thoughts on these issues.
22:47	And I do believe we have to differentiate between two types of negotiation with terrorists: the strategic negotiation and the tactical negotiation. The tactical negotiation is on a basis of concrete need in hostage barricade situations and so on and so forth, which I believe in any case this is the responsibility of any state to negotiate for freeing the hostages of oneself; and the no-negotiation policy cannot hold water, and it's a mistake to have that.
22:18	In reference to the strategic negotiation, we have to understand that, just by deciding to negotiate with the terrorists, you actually give them some kind of legitimacy. And terrorists are striving for legitimacy. And I'm not saying that you should not necessarily give it to them, but you have to have a certain price for that.
23:40	The other classification that we have to bear in mind when we discuss negotiation with terrorists is that there are two types of negotiation: one is the open, public, official negotiation and the other one is what was referred in the last panel as 'talks'—the confidential, secretive, non-official types of talks—and definitely there is a difference between the two.
24:04	I would like to argue that the terrorists, in general terms, are trying to win or to hold the stick from both ends. On one hand, they want to preserve terrorism, they want still on achieving their effectiveness from terrorism. On the other hand, as I said, they are striving for legitimacy. And this is something that we, as people who suffer from the phenomenon of terrorism, should not fall into this trap. This is on one hand.

24:29	But on the other hand, from my point of view, if we would be able by negotiation to find a way to move terrorists from their violent terrorist activity into another way, this is a success in counter-terrorism. I see this as pure success in counter-terrorism. If you asked me what is one of the biggest successes of President Bush in his term, it's definitely not Iraq, that's for sure; maybe not even Afghanistan; but it may be the success of bringing over the Libyans to the enlightened world and not to what he called the `axis of evil' world.
25:10	So what is the conclusion? In order to answer if and when and should we have preconditions when we decide to discuss and to have negotiation with terrorists, I think we have to go back to the core issue or the core definition of the term `terrorism'. I'm sorry that we are discussing this just in the last session, but I'm a freak of the definition of `terrorism'—I wrote extensively about it. And I believe that a working definition that we have to adopt should be, first of all, understanding that terrorism is a <i>strategy</i> —no more and no less. It's a strategy, it's an effective strategy in order to achieve a political goal.
25:52	Second, terrorism is a specific type of violence which is aimed against <i>civilians</i> . I do not refer to attacks against military personnel as terrorism; I will refer to that as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and so on and so forth. So I do believe that the world can agree, and I do believe that the world is already agreeing, because we have the 1599 Security Council decision which says terrorism as such is: `the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians is forbidden and is always illegitimate'. On that we can all agree—Muslim and Jews and people that are engaged in this violent activity, and people who are fighting those activities, and so on and so forth.
26:37	The other argument I would like to argue: the terrorists, as far as I know them, in my research in the last twenty, twenty-five, thirty years in this field, terrorists, almost all of them, are rational players. What's a rational player altogether? It's a player that calculates costs and benefits. In choosing the alternative which in the eye of the beholder is more beneficial. That's exactly what terrorists are doing. That's exactly what the Red Brigade was doing, that's exactly what al-Qaeda is doing, that's exactly what Hamas is doing. This is rational thinking.
27:20	This is the good news, my friends: because if they have rational thinking, they have calculation of costs and benefits, and if you <i>understand</i> the way they think—the way that the last panel explained to us, and so on and so forth—if you understand that, then you can have the strategies which will influence their cost and benefit analysis.

27:32	Negotiation, in my view, is one way in which you can use it in order to change the cost/benefit analysis altogether. So if you're asking me do we need preconditions? Should we talk with the extremists, with radicals? The answer I would not put as a precondition the disarmament of the terrorist organisation. I would not put as a precondition mutual recognition between the state and the organisation. I would not put as a precondition even the demand to stop violence! But I would put <i>one</i> precondition, which is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians—meaning terrorism. And I think that on that we can reach an agreement.
28:14	Of course, you can have <i>during</i> the dialogue, during the negotiation, you can have other demands which are give-and—take type of demands, and this is fine. So from my point of view, it's not a matter or it's not the case that I am asking myself: Do they have a political arm? Are they active in the political arena? Were they elected in a democratic election? This is not necessarily important for me. Nor, Do they hold very extreme views and very radical views? This is also not a matter of interest for me when I think about negotiation with terrorists. The only thing that interests me is the international moral threshold that has to be adopted by everyone, and this is prohibiting the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians.
29:03	Thank you. <i>[applause]</i>
End of Dr Boaz Ganor's address	

Kjell Magne Bondevik: former Prime Minister, Norway

30:10	Thank you so much. When answering the question that this panel engaged in with relish as to do negotiations work, I want to start by saying that I fundamentally believe in dialogue as a key to peaceful settlements or violent conflicts. And I will try to explain why.
31:42	So I think we should try to explore and exhaust the opportunities for dialogue in negotiations between conflicting parties. Because, when successful, these can lead to a marginalisation of radical elements in a society, and that is good in itself. And, above all, we must give support to moderate forces in order to achieve this objective.
31:11	And I was also very interested in the discussion earlier today about the Western world and the Islamic world. And just in brackets, I will say that my own Centre for Peace and Human Rights, we are engaged with moderate forces in the Muslim world, especially through a project or core operation with the former President Mohammad Khatami of Iran. And that's a very interesting experience, because there are so many misunderstandings and so much misinterpretation between the Islamic and the Western world, so it's a great job to do, to clarify this.
31:51	And I also just want to say that when <i>[sound almost disappears]</i> talk about terrorists, I think if we should address that issue we must also analyse the root causes of terrorism. What are making people terrorists? That's a key question. You cannot solve this without trying to answer that question. And in my view, the main answer to that question is: humiliation. I repeat it: humiliation.
32:20	If people are feeling humiliated, they become desperate, and they can be terrorists. And humiliation can come out of occupation—I think that's one of the reasons why we experience what happens now among the Palestinians. Humiliation can come out of the fact that people feel that 'the others are looking down upon us', as second-class—a second-class religion, for instance, a second-class country. That is humiliating, and we must be aware of that. And this is an important issue to address in the relations between Islam and the West of today. But that was a bracket. All right!
32:58	So, the next thing is I will also just make another clarification. It may be useful to draw a clear distinction between internal conflicts—between a state actor and a non-state actor, or self-determination movement, on the one hand; and on the other hand, international terror networks, such as al-Qaeda or others. It's very important to differentiate between these two cases. You can have different approaches to them, also—I'll come back on that.

33:32	Because an international terror network has more or less as their only goal destruction and destabilisation. That's <i>not</i> the fact, mainly, with internal conflicts. Because in cases where a self-determination movement acts, very often what has happened is over time a result of discrimination against a minority. We may look upon their way of acting as terrorism, when <i>they</i> consider their way of acting as military means for a defined political end.
34:23	And because of the state party's superior military strength, they may feel it's the only effective means available to them, to use weapons to get the necessary attention to their case. We should be aware of that. In such cases, when we talk about an internal conflict—as we will do on Sri Lanka, which I'll come back to—I do not believe that a military solution imposed by the barrel of the gun can be sustainable in the long term. Rather, we see that the use of military force in such cases has seemed to spark only increased hatred, violence, and violence in the long term. We see that in Sri Lanka today, and we see it also in the Palestinian-Israeli case. There is no lasting military solutions to these conflicts.
35:16	But the minorities have legitimate claims on their respective sites. And I think this can really only be addressed through political process involving dialogue and negotiations. What is the price on negotiations with such groups? Peace processes tend mainly to be inherently undemocratic. What do I mean by that? Military self-determination movements, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil, LTT in Sri Lanka—tend to be very, very authoritarian. They are <i>very</i> authoritarian; they're not democratic at <i>all</i> —we should be aware of that.
36:02	Unfortunately, we have through history seen very few examples of such movements truly managing to transform themselves to real political parties in a truly democratic sense. I can say that Norway and Sri Lanka, where, under my time as Prime Minister, the President called me and asked, 'Can Norway contribute to facilitate the peace process with the Tamil Tigers?' 'Yes,' I said, 'under some preconditions, yes.' We knew that it was a risk.
36:34	And we tried also through the process, through significant efforts, to inspire change within LTT from a guerrilla movement to a political party, so they could be integrated in the democratic process of their country. We didn't succeed, so far. Still, I think this is a useful effort in the longer term. But, however, at the time, opposition politicians in the Tamil areas were frequently assassinated, despite efforts to develop a more democratic approach.
37:17	Perhaps our efforts may seem naïve in the short term, but nonetheless they were and they remain necessary. This may explain why countries and groups that have terror-listed the LTT, such as the United States and the EU, fully supported the Norwegian-facilitated negotiation process with LTT—despite they terror-listed them. Be aware of that. Yeah, they even participated as co-chairs of the process!

37:54	A key lesson in cases where parties in military conflicts meet around a negotiating table: the facilitator, in this case Norway, must have a clear analysis and strategy on how to include the interests of other parties and groups along the way so as to generate broad support and momentum for a peace process.
38:16	It's a mistake if you are in negotiations with, for instance, terrorist groups to only take care of <i>their</i> interests, because they are not always representative of their minority group. So you have also to bear in mind and take care of the interests of other people within the same minority—for instance, an ethnic minority.
38:43	In Sri Lanka we achieved a ceasefire agreement at some stage. But we never really got very far with respect to a comprehensive <i>political</i> solution, and there were clear reasons for that, to be very frank here. The authoritarian leader of LTT, Mr Pirapaharan—wanted for a number of political killings in Sri Lanka and even India: [that ?] Gandhi will know—he would never be accepted as a leader of Sri Lanka. Pirapaharan understands this, and hence will never give up his military strategy.
39:34	During his reign over the LTT, there will therefore always, I think, unfortunately be two military forces in Sri Lanka unless LTT is defeated. So reaching beyond the ceasefire has therefore so far proved impossible.
39:56	So let me end up by saying that we have to be willing to take some chances along the way if we engaged in such processes. A quest for ideal circumstances, of perfect solutions, can be the enemy of realistic and pragmatic solutions that point to a better future.
40:18	And let me give you an example from another country where Norway has been engaged. Although the peace process that I was involved in in Guatemala was not perfect, it produced a peace and prepared the ground for a better life for people in that country. And still the ceasefire and the peace agreement is respected in Guatemala.
40:42	My government was also actively engaged in the North/South process of Sudan. That ceasefire and peace agreement is still more or less respected; but we have conflicts in other parts of Sudan, we know. And I think this agreement has saved thousands of lives after January 2005, when we reached it.
41:07	So, to conclude: We must approach radicals in ways that over time marginalise their influence. Constructive dialogue on negotiations can be a key part of this process. However, I believe we must also be careful that we do not give legitimacy to terror networks that are ultimately destructive by nature—for instance, al-Qaeda.
41:41	So I think we have to differentiate between international terrorist networks, with destabilisation as their main goal; and on the other hand, groups fighting -

00:30 - differentiate between these two cases. That is my main answer. And put preconditions if you're trying to be a facilitator or a mediator, to negotiate with extremists and with terrorist groups. Thank you. *[applause]*

End of Kjell Magne Bondevik's address

Andres Pastrana: former President, Colombia

01:47 Thank you, Kim. Yes, Peter invited me to talk a little bit about what's happening in Colombia, to give an overview of my experience in the peace process we had between 1998–2002. So I want to give you a quick view on the case of Colombia.

02:04 First of all it's, I think, a unique case. We have the oldest armed conflict in the world— this conflict that started in 1964 with the guerrilla groups that have been trying to take over government through armed actions and terrorism. If you see the history of Colombia, you will find that we had all types of different guerrilla movements:

- FARC: supported by the former USSR;
- ELN: supported, and it's a pro-Cuban movement;
- EPL: pro-Maoist movement;
- Quintin Lame: indigenous movement;
- M-19: it was a national movement.

So we had all the problems in Colombia.

02:45 However, I think that Colombia, at the same time you have to be aware, with a conflict of more than forty years, we are the oldest democracy in Latin America, with a healthy and stable economy and healthy political system.

03:03 These groups started to act when their search for power through violence was to some extent accepted by the international community. Some countries, like the Soviet Union, as I said before, supported these groups, *financed* the FARC, or Cuban finance or support the ELN, in the case of Colombia. This today is not tolerated any more in the world, and countries do not openly support or train groups who use terrorism as a political tool.

03:35 That's why the case of the guerrillas of Colombia, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, they decide to finance themselves through kidnappings, multinationals, and on the other side drug trafficking. Today the latter is the main source of money, and they now, the guerrilla movements in Colombia, especially the FARC, take part in every step of the production and in the change of narco-trafficking. In some cases now they're exporting directly, and that's why they are now one of the largest drug cartels in the world.

03:16 I want to give you all some figures, because if we are financed by narco-terrorism, I think you should be aware of that.

03:25	The annual sales of drugs are higher than Coca-Cola. Between 1998–2000 there were \$50 billion. If the drug industry was accepted as one of the 500 of <i>Fortune</i> companies, it will be Number 1 over Microsoft. In 2002 Microsoft sold \$44.3 billion; Walt Disney \$34.2 billion; Coca-Cola \$24.8 billion; the drug industry, as I said before, over \$50 billion. Now we have in the United States 24.2 million users of Coca and over 24 million over-12's have tried it once.
05:21	I was very surprised the other day, when they captured one of the drug lords in Colombia, that they took his computer. And in the computer the gains of only one guy were \$70 million a month. And that's what we suppose is what the FARC is getting through the drug business: they are getting between \$1–2 million a day, more than \$365 million, over \$70 million a year, to buy arms and to make terrorist acts in Colombia.
05:53	But even in this scenario I completely agree with my friend Bondevik: I still believe, and I'm a true believer, that peace will come to Colombia only through negotiations. And I want to address specifically what I consider the worst criminal act that guerrillas perpetrate in Colombia. I myself in the decade of the Eighties was a victim. I was kidnapped by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel and the Cali Cartel. And I can tell you that that was the most dramatic experience in my life.
06:32	And guerrillas in Colombia consider a kidnap as a political tool. Some people in my country have remained kidnapped for more than ten years, We have policemen, we have military officers, we have politicians, members of he Congress, Congressmen, members of the Senate, a former presidential candidate, and hundreds of innocent Colombians—more than 2,000 Colombians still are kidnapped, some of them by the guerrilla movements.
07:04	And I want to take this opportunity today to ask the world, the international community, to reject the criminal practice of kidnapping and demand from the FARC; the freedom of all the people they have kidnapped. I think this is also a good example today to discuss if a negotiation to have all these people freed is acceptable. I think that's the discussion these days in Colombia.
07:33	The FARC have proposed that kidnapped victims will be released in exchange for guerrillas in jail through a political accord. During my administration, with the FARC, they had about 440 members, policemen and military kidnapped. And within the constitutional frame and the law, we were able to free more than 400 members of the police and the military through a negotiation. If we had not negotiated, I think today they maybe would still kidnap.
08:10	In the case of a negotiation with a terrorist group, in this case it was fruitful. The main reason was because both parties decided to negotiate, and there was, I think—also very important in this type of negotiation—the political <i>will</i> to do it.

08:30	I tried, as I said before, to have a peace process and dialogue with the FARC, but at the same time I was strengthening my armed forces, I was responding in what Colombia was called the mandate for peace—more than ten million Colombians voted in 1997 to give a mandate to the President who was going to be elected in 1998, a mandate to try to achieve peace in the four years.
08:57	I started since the first day, and from the beginning I think that also, in a process of negotiation, you should establish very clear the principles in which you are going to negotiate. The negotiation, in the case of my country, the whole negotiation was taking place within the constitution, and democracy and fundamental rights were non-negotiable. Only what the constitution and the law allowed us.
09:30	As President of Colombia—and I think, really, the other day someone in a different forum told me it was a unique experience—when I was elected President of the country, I said that I was going to talk with the guerrillas. I went with one of my friends, that was appointed a Peace Commissioner, to talk in the middle of the jungle with the leader of the FARC, to ask him if he had the real will to try to achieve a peace process in Colombia. And in that moment I went into the middle of the jungle in a small aeroplane, and I remember talking to him. I said, ‘Hey, Marulanda,’—he’s the leader of the FARC; the comrades calls him ‘Sure-Shot’, ‘ <i>Tirofijo</i> ’ in the case of Colombia—I said, ‘How many people do you have around here while we are speaking here about peace?’ And he said, ‘To take protection for you, Mr President, we had about 2,000 to 3,000 <i>guerrilleros</i> taking care of you.’ I was alone with my Peace Commissioner, asking them if they really want to try to achieve a peace process.
10:35	But while emphasising the need for them to be committed to this peace process, I also—and I think this important—warned them that all military actions will be taken if they don’t have a real political will to negotiate. The negotiation, however—I have to accept it; and I said to my friend Bondevik, ‘Know that it had a very, very high political cost for me. There were significant arguments, but the FARC never understood that negotiation in the midst of the conflict posed serious threat, the first of which was that people stopped supporting the process. They continued with terrorist attacks—putting car bombs, kidnapping civilians—and only at the end of the process the FARC understood that steps needed to be taken to have a visible negotiation, and they even signed a document trying really to look for a ceasefire in their country.
11:40	But at that point the people were already tired of the process, and they did not want negotiations to continue. One must—I think it’s also this, important—not confuse the will to talk with weakness. It is the other way around. More political will and more courage is necessary to conduct one negotiation. I always said that the easiest thing to do is war. The only thing you need is to pull a trigger. But the difficult thing is to try to achieve <i>peace</i> , because you have high political risk if you try to achieve it.

12:22	Today, I still believe that Colombia can only solve its armed conflict through dialogue, while also—and this is important—keeping military actions. And, something that I think was very important for us, and I think that for the first time the FARC was understanding the involvement of the international community to build inside Colombia a national consensus.
12:51	I think the international community is very important, because I remember when I was talking for the first time with the FARC, they always started: ‘The international community’s supporting the state. It’s supporting the establishment;’ they are against them. And I said, ‘That’s not true. If we try to achieve a peace process, the one to be in charge of guaranteeing that this process is going forward is going to be the international community. Governments may change. My party may win or may lose the election. Another government will come. But the international community is the one that is going to really guarantee the process.’
13:28	And that’s why I think that it’s very important for us: the support of the international community is very important for us, as happened with the United States. The Senator knows that with Plan Colombia, with the theory of co-responsibility the United States gives support to Colombia. I created Plan Colombia with President Clinton and then with the support of President Bush. \$7.5 billion in the last five years, helping Colombia on the military side to fight the drug business, but on the other hand and very important, on the <i>social side</i> .
14:00	Today Mexico decide the same thing with the United States. I don’t know if it’s going to be called Plan Mexico. But \$500 million a year is going to be sent to Mexico to fight also the drug cartels. So I think that with the support of the United States, and now with the European Union, in all the social development, looking forward, basically, alternative development, I think that we could achieve a peace process if we get rid of one of our biggest problems—that is drugs—that is consuming the United States. Those are the ones at the end of their fuelling, with consumption are [comforting?] Colombia, and now they’re starting to have big problems in Europe.
14:41	Only to finish, a story I remember when I finished my term in 2002. One international journalist came to my office, to make an interview to me. And he said, ‘Mr President, you know, with all these problems—you have paramilitary guerrillas, narco-trafficking, problems in the economy around the world—do you sleep well or do you have nightmares?’ And I said, ‘I sleep very well! Because in Colombia nightmares start when you wake up.’
15:08	Thank you very much. <i>[laughter, applause]</i>
End of Andres Pastrana’s address	
Q&A	

15:35	<p>Clara O'Donnell Clara O'Donnell, Centre for European Reform. I've got a question for Boaz Ganor. You mentioned that if there should be one precondition for negotiations, it should be to stop using violence against civilians. I was wondering on that basis if we could apply it to the current Palestinian situation. Hamas is actually making some calls for ceasefire. Now, if these were to be acted upon—and included, of course, any violence with citizens—do you then argue that one should start having wider negotiations with them and recognising them as apolitical force? Thank you.</p>
16:08	<p>Boaz Ganor Well, good question, actually. Based on what I've said, if Hamas would declare and would back up its words with deeds on the scene, that he is not any more going to attack civilians—and I'm not talking about attacking Israeli military personnel; attack <i>civilians</i>—and he will not incite for people to do so, I would definitely not put any precondition in talking with Hamas.</p>
16:41	<p>The problem is, the question is: is there any merit for that? It's not a question of morality or a question of a precondition; it's a question now of what are we going to achieve in that? The utmost thing that we can achieve is a truce—a truce for a certain period of time, several years or something like that. That's what they offer. The main problem here: unlike a Fatah organisation or the PLO, the Hamas doesn't hide it. He has one ultimate goal, and this is the destruction of Israel.</p>
17:14	<p>So Israel definitely would not negotiate on the terms of the destruction of Israel! So we can, of course, negotiate and talk about this truce and the other truce—they might gain some time to recover; we might gain some time to flourish economically, I don't know what. I'm not against it. But I don't see, frankly, any merit in such a discussion with Hamas. But it's not an ideological prohibition, from my point of view.</p>
17:47	<p>Kim Campbell I have two - actually I have three hands right over there at the end there. I just want to make sure...(A few days ago it became known that...) Would you mind just introducing yourself? Thank you.</p>
17:55	<p>Mr Jungman[?] Mr Jungman, from the Netherlands. Two days ago it became known that Israel and Hamas <i>were</i> negotiating under the guidance of the Swiss Government. But it was made public by Mr Abbas, and now the whole thing has blown up. So this brings me to the question: when you have started negotiations, how do you deal with spoilers? Can anyone comment on that?</p>
18:18	<p>Kim Campbell Did you have spoilers in Ireland?! No, no spoilers, nobody let the cat out of the bag?</p>

18:26	<p>Dr Boaz Ganor</p> <p>Okay, I'll refer to that. First of all, you are definitely right. I didn't refer even to negotiation on the release of this soldier that Hamas is holding, Shalit. This negotiation is being conducted at this very moment, and it's the tactical type of negotiation that we refer to there.</p>
18:48	<p>The question of spoiler is a very good question. This was one of the problems of the Oslo Accords, the spoilers. But the spoiler at that time was Hamas. So maybe the spoiler of that time now can find a way to restrict others not to spoil that. In any case, as I said before, if Hamas would stop deliberate attacks against civilians and would ask for negotiation, I would go for it. If Hamas would not be able to deal with the spoilers, I would stop this negotiation.</p>
19:22	<p>Kim Campbell</p> <p>Thank you. The gentleman just behind. I've got three people who have hands up there, so I'll take your... Go ahead.</p>
19:28	<p>Eddie Kafadumas[?]</p> <p>Yes, I'm Eddie Kafadumas from the All Party Parliamentary Group on Conflict Issues. We concentrate on conflict resolution, prevention and transformation. My question really is about radicalisation and political violence, particularly in regard to negotiations. The term 'political violence' is, of course, being used in relation to terrorist groups. Can it also be applied to the actions of government? And to what extent does the political violence of government help the process of radicalisation?</p>
20:02	<p>For example, according to Boaz' definition of terrorism, the United Nations is a terrorist organisation if you consider the sanctions that they placed on Iraq from 1991–2003, which UNICEF said killed at least half a million Iraqi children, and caused the resignation of Denis Halliday, who was the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, his successor, Hans von Sponik and the Head of the UN World Food Programme.</p>
20:38	<p>So to what extent should we turn this lens around and look at the actions of our own governments in helping to fuel radicalisation?</p>
20:49	<p>Kim Campbell</p> <p>Well, there's an easy question that somebody can just throw off a quick answer to! Kjell, do you want to say any comment about that?</p>
20:58	<p>Kjell Magne Bondevik</p> <p>I see your point absolutely, and I think to come out of such situations where you have terrorist organisations killing people, you have to analyse the situation. And you have to analyse also how they feel the situation from their point of view. And sometimes you are right, that even international organisations or a state government, in a way, act which can be defined as terrorist. I mean, because civilians are killed.</p>

21:38	But let me also say that it was referred here regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Oslo Accords, which Norway facilitated. It's very difficult, I think, to put as a precondition before you even <i>talk</i> with a terrorist organisation that you have to give up using violence and terror <i>before</i> you start talking to them. Because I don't think they will do that, because they'll leave their only weapon before they have achieved anything.
22:23	So I think the way out of this is that you must have some informal talks, not formal negotiations, but informal talks to try to find out if it's possible under specific conditions to bring them into a position where they will give up using terror and violence. You don't sit around a formal negotiating table, but there are many possibilities of secret channels to find this out. And that's what very often is the case.
22:56	Also it was with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. PLO had not given up using terror before they started talking to the Israelis in Oslo. But it was secret, it was not formal negotiations in the beginning. It was informal talks. And then they found out. They built up confidence between the two parties, and they found out that, yes, under specific conditions PLO is willing to give up using terror. But if you put it as a precondition before you ever meet them, you will never succeed, in my view.
23:22	Kim Campbell Both Boaz and Andres just want to make a quick comment on this, and I'll ask you to be quick, because we have several hands up.
23:34	Dr Boaz Ganor Yeah, I'll be a little bit a party-breaker, and excuse me that I beg to differ with your approach. If you ask me if there is a situation in which states might play a negative role, yes: when Mr Bondevik is saying that there is a possibility—now there is a possibility. And let me quote: 'There are some times that terrorists have good reasons for terrorism.' This is, in my view, a way that you would persuade radicals to use terrorism. First and foremost, you have to define terrorism as the deliberate use of violence against civilians. This has nothing that can legitimise that. Nothing whatsoever. The biggest evil on earth cannot justify that.
24:22	Now, the second thing that we heard, that states might also be regarded as terrorists because they kill civilians. Well, listen very carefully to the definition: In wartime, civilians are being hurt. We know that in the Geneva Conventions, we know that in the IHL, the Humanitarian Law, and so on and so forth. What makes states and people who are being sent by states a war criminal is the deliberate use of violence against civilians, not the fact that civilians are being hurt.
24:52	Now, if the question is 'Can states do terrorism?' the answer is yes. But states, when they do terrorism, are and can and should be prosecuted as war criminals. We don't have this when we're talking about sub-states. We have to have the same moral understanding and acceptance.

25:12	<p>Now, the last thing I want to say: the argument here was: 'Well, what do you want from them? That's the only tool that they can hold.' Excuse me, that's wrong! First of all, there are so many political ways that you can strive for and fight for your goals and achieve them. Second, I would argue that you can even use <i>violence</i>, but not the deliberate use of violence against civilians! Now, why don't use it? Because today terrorism is the most effective tactics. <i>This</i> is the reason why there is terrorism: not because of humiliation. You were talking about humiliation and occupation. What about socio-economical reasons? What about separatistic reasons? What about freedom fighters? What about anarchists? What about communists and other extreme ideologies? So many reasons! Who can decide what is a good reason and what is not a good reason? We can decide what is a tactic or a strategy which should be forbidden in any case—and this is the deliberate use of violence against civilians.</p>
26:19	<p>Why they don't stop doing it? Because we refer to them as the same. If a person was engaged in killing military personnel, he would be prosecuted and he would be punished the same way that he would be punished if he killed a civilian. He would be called a terrorist in the same way. He would be freeing prisoners release in the same way. We have to change our moral values and then, by that, to influence their calculation of cost and benefits, and it's possible to achieve it.</p>
26:35	<p>Kim Campbell Well, I wanted to move on. I'll give you a chance at that at the very end. Andres wanted to get his oar in here—very quickly, because I have two more hands that I promised to answer.</p>
26:42	<p>Andres Pastrana Yeah, very quickly. Thank you. Your question is very interesting. In our case, in the case in Colombia, I don't know if you know that the President of Colombia, President Uribe, is involved in a peace process with the paramilitary groups, that make a lot of massacres, and acting as a political group. But I would go even one more step. For example, one of the leaders of the paramilitary group said that one of the ways of getting finance to make all these massacres came from a multinational: Chiquita. Now, it's under investigation in the United States. I asked the Attorney General of Colombia to investigate a multinational company financing paramilitaries to take the products out of Colombia in exchange for arms for the paramilitary groups.</p>
27:38	<p>Second, I think there is a good example in the case of Colombia of the separation of powers between the justice and the central government. Sixty of almost 200 members of the Congress of Colombia are in jail today because of their links with the paramilitaries. They were in links with them to get votes to get elected into the US Congress. And maybe by the end of the year we could have 100 members of the Parliament linked with the paramilitary groups.</p>

28:09	<p>And third, what's going to happen because the government approval in Colombia that these people that are accused of making massacres, they will pay between five to eight years. What's going to happen with the International Penal Court? Will they agree with that? Now we have to be aware that we have a Penal International Court. So what's going to happen, also, for those governments who are promoting terrorist acts inside or, at least, hand by hand with them try to make these type of actions inside different countries? I think that's also an important point of view.</p>
28:45	<p>Kim Campbell We have five minutes, and I have two hands here that I promised to answer. And if you could ask your questions or pose your questions, and then I'll ask the panel to respond, and they can make any other comments that they want to in the last minute and a half. Go ahead.</p>
28:58	<p>Dr Jeroen Gunning Okay, thank you. Jeroen Gunning from the Centre for Study of Radicalisation, Aberystwyth—we have one too, there! Just on Boaz' point, but I think and bring in some of the other things about taking risks. I thought it was interesting you said what's the point of negotiating with Hamas? If you put it in a contextual situation—which interestingly some Hamas leaders did when I interviewed them, and they said, 'Look, if we come to a truce with Israel and there is economic development—not just in Israel but in the Palestinian territories—the population is going to turn against violence. They're not going to support a campaign; they want prosperity. By that point we will not be able to convince them of our position right now. We will have to then negotiate about actual peace and recognition of Israel. Now we can't do that and we don't want to do it—we don't trust Israel, etc.'—all these kind of things—'but in the future it might...'</p>
29:46	<p>I think there's an interesting point. I mean, it's a risk, because, as you say, Hamas may rearm itself and it may get worse. But there's also opportunity. So that's one. And just to kind of put a tail-end on that: What's interesting – <i>(Quick, quick!)</i> Sorry.</p>
30:01	<p>Well, just one sentence. The panellists have focused on when it's good to negotiate with terrorists. I think it would also be interesting to see whether terrorist groups would trust the government enough to enter negotiations with them. Because I think in the case of Hamas there's also the previous experience of Fatah and their perception that negotiations were about strengthening Israel's hold over the territories, rather than a two-state solution. Which may not be true, but it's the perception. Thank you.</p>
30:27	<p>Kim Campbell And my friend from Geneva, who was going to have the last question, and then I'll get the panellists to respond.</p>

30:32	<p>Achim Wennmann Achim Wennmann from the Graduate Institute of International Studies. My question is: what are your experience on the success and failures of engaging on economic issues in peace processes?</p>
30:44	<p>Kim Campbell That was the success or failure rate in engaging in economic issues in the peace process. I'm going to ask the panellists now to quickly respond to these issues, and any last comments they have, in twenty seconds or less! Garret FitzGerald, you've been having a quiet time here! You're up first.</p>
31:01	<p>H.E. Garret FitzGerald Yeah, the discussion has confirmed my feeling that the Northern Ireland situation was too generous and that, well, <i>some</i> lessons may be drawn from it. The particular circumstances were such that it was different from and needed to be handled differently from other situations. And that's why nobody's bothered me with questions! Thank you. <i>[laughter]</i></p>
31:23	<p>Kim Campbell But you also had some international community involvement too. I mean, I would think that's something that's...</p>
31:29	<p>H.E. Garret FitzGerald Well, yeah. No, our view was that involving other countries in general would not be helpful, apart from Northern Ireland and Britain. The United States could occasionally be helpful, and was in negotiation at the end of the day. But basically it was not going to help to involve other countries and alienate the possibility of working well closely with Britain in resolving the problem. Our problem was to persuade Britain to mollify their policy, and we had to do that. If other people had been involved, it might make it more difficult, not easier.</p>
32:04	<p>Kim Campbell Mr Bondevik.</p>
32:05	<p>Kjell Magne Bondevik First, just a clarification to my Israeli friend here. I didn't say that there are good reasons for using terror—definitely <i>not!</i> But what I tried to say is that even terrorists can have a good case. I would not recommend them to use terror, of course; but they can have a good case and reason for their fight. And therefore we will not solve any such problem without analysing and addressing the root causes of terrorism. We must <i>understand</i> that. <i>(That's right)</i> Not accepting terrorism, that's another case. So be very clear on that.</p>

32:46	Secondly, I think we also should be aware that many react because they feel that we in the West use double standards. Double standards is a main problem in the world of today. <i>(Yeah)</i> When we have one standard for human rights in one country, we must use the same standard in another country, despite maybe they are not our friends. But one standard in a country which we like and another standard in another country, that will make reactions. <i>(Yes!)</i> I think you should also be aware of that.
33:16	Third point was economic help. He asked a country question. Yes, of course if an unjust distribution of welfare is one of the problems which has made a conflict, then the improvement of economic living conditions for the people in the region can help. But very often there are other, more root, causes for their fighting.
33:48	I would also say that following up a peace agreement with development assistance and humanitarian assistance is very important to keep the peace agreement to be respected. Thank you.
33:52	Kim Campbell Thank you. Boaz, do you want to make...?
33:53	Dr Boaz Ganor Yes, I'll be short. You were saying a good case—terrorists sometimes have a good case. Good case for what? Good case for using terrorism? <i>(No!)</i> But even if you say no, that's what you're implying when you say they have sometimes good cases.
34:07	Kim Campbell I think what he means is that they may have legitimate grievances, but terrorism...
34:11	Dr Boaz Ganor Okay, so it's not a good case! That's something else. <i>[laughter]</i> But furthermore, double standards, you are right!
34:16	Kim Campbell That's how wars start!
34:18	Dr Boaz Ganor Double standards, you are right. We know, and we read the history, and in the history we see that usually those who win the war are not prosecuted, though the [close?] the war are being prosecuted. You are definitely right, all of us have to work to change that. <i>But</i> the basic concept of the Geneva Convention says that one evil does not justify another evil. So there is no, cannot be, any understanding for the deliberate use of violence against civilians.
34:55	Dr Boaz Ganor Now, in order to end my words in a more not-Israeli manner, <i>[laughter]</i> I would say that we appreciate very much what the Scandinavians are doing and what the Norwegians are doing, especially something which we didn't talk about here, on the matter of people-to-people kind of activity in order to try to build trust. And this is, in my view, one of the other things that we have to discuss in further conferences: how to develop that as dealing with a counter-radicalisation process. Building trust.

35:20	<p>Kim Campbell Thank you. Andres.</p>
35:21	<p>Andres Pastrana I think that in the case of South America, definitely, Latin America, political and economical issues are going to be fundamental. We saw that in Guatemala, in El Salvador, and in the last agreement with the FARC one of the things was economic issues to be taken to the agenda in discussion to try to achieve a peace process. So I think, for example, agrarian reform, redistribution of income—you know, all these type of issues that they are interested in getting onto the table of negotiation.</p>
<p>End of Q&A</p>	
35:57	<p>Kim Campbell Thank you very much. This concludes the final panel of this conference. And I think, if nothing else has been demonstrated clearly throughout <i>all</i> of our discussions in the last two days, it is the need for a centre that addresses the complex issues, not just of political radicalisation as it can happen in contexts of individuals and small groups, but the whole phenomenon of political violence. It's really inefficacy as a tool for solving problems. The legacies it leaves behind it, the challenges it creates to people to try and find scenarios in their own countries that will enable them to move beyond. And I think it's very sobering to think that in Colombia this has been a problem going on since 1964—that was the year I graduated from high school: I was very precocious, I want you to know! <i>[laughter]</i></p>
36:43	<p>But, I mean, it's mind-boggling to think of that. It's also reassuring to know that even in that context Colombia has built an effective democracy and, even aside from the drug trade, appears to have a decent economy. But it is a very, very significant and difficult challenge. It requires a lot more work, it requires us to bring together the experience of people in practical solutions, practical insights, mechanisms for trying to move things ahead. I want to say thank you to our panel: Andres Pastrana, Garret FitzGerald, Kjell Magne Bondevik and Boaz Ganor. Thank you very much for being here. Thank <i>you</i>, and onward and upward. I don't know—Peter Neumann—over to you for the last word. But thank you again for your attention. <i>[applause]</i></p>
37:26	<p>Dr Peter Neumann Thank you very much. Before you get up and leave, I just wanted to reiterate what Kim's just said. This was really just a starting point, and it would have been very surprising— yesterday some people complained there was too much agreement: I'm very happy we had some disagreement! Because that's actually very useful, and that's one of the things that we can build on in our work.</p>
37:50	<p>As they said yesterday, the principal purpose of this conference was to pick up on arguments, to take stock and collect ideas that we can now frame in terms of projects and issues and research. And that's exactly what we're going to do.</p>

38:04	Some of the projects are detailed in our handbook—and the handbook, as is the conference, is free, so please do take it with you; read it on the tube or on your flight, or wherever you go. It's definitely worth reading. And we also have a website, which you see here: www.icsr.info . Since Mary Robinson mentioned at least five websites yesterday, I thought I could slip ours in!
38:31	There's one more thing that I want to mention, and that's very important. I want to thank the people who have really organised the conference—and that's not including me. The staff at RIBA, the press office at King's, the student volunteers who have helped us throughout the conference in a tremendous way. I think they deserve a round of applause. <i>[applause]</i>
39:00	And in addition to them, there are too many to mention, I have to say. But I'm taking them for a drink tonight, so they get their reward! <i>[laughter]</i>
39:08	The people that I have worked with over the past few months to get this show on the road, I want to mention by name. That's Dina Esfandiary, Jacob Stoil, Stephen Tankel and, especially and importantly, Debbie Berger, who is literally about to give birth, but who has worked very, very – extremely hard on this conference until the very last day. <i>[applause]</i>
39:35	So let me... The last words I want to say: if you didn't like the conference, please blame me—it's completely my fault! If you did like the conference, please consider that all these people have been responsible. I hope we can all stay in touch, and please send me an email if you want to know more about ICSR, and I promise I will reply, even though in the past few weeks I've not been very good with replying to emails. Thank you very much for coming (<i>Thank you, Peter</i>), and I hope to see you soon.
40:00	Dr Boaz Ganor In the name of all of us, I would like to thank Peter as well!
40:32	Other Panellists Peter! <i>[applause]</i>
END	