

**Addressing Radicalisation and Political Violence:  
Conclusions of Seven Expert Groups**  
**(1) Mustafa Cerić, Grand Mufti, Bosnia-Herzegovina**  
**“The Role of Religion in Radicalisation”**

02:16	Thank you, Mr Chairman, for giving me to speak. Firstly, though, I would prefer to speak at least the second, to see how the others will perform! But since I have to rush to Sarajevo, then thank you very much for understanding my situation.
02:39	My report will be in two parts. First, a personal statement about this conference, and then the group statement that I was reading.
02:53	When I received the first email from the initiator of this conference, Dr Peter Neumann, I did not respond immediately to this invitation. Why? Because when I saw the title ‘Radicalisation and Political Violence’ and ‘the first International Conference’ and something that is organised in London by four prominent institutions from the United States, Jordan, Israel and UK, I thought, ‘This is a very good idea that they do such work.’
03:39	But when you now mention terrorism, radicalisation, violence, you immediately think about Islam and Muslims. So I thought, ‘Let it be without me this time.’ Because as a Muslim and Grand Mufti of Bosnia-Herzegovina, wherever I go I hear some general observations which imply that somehow Islam is on the defence and everyone has the right to accuse those who do things on behalf of Islam.
04:21	So, if those who are accusing or implying, then I have to defend. The problem is this: in the end, we end up that he who is accusing doesn’t know what he’s accusing any more, and I don’t know what I am defending! So because of that confusion, then it is very difficult now to know what we are talking about.
04:54	But later, when I was approached by my friends telling me, ‘But this is an important conference! You should <i>come</i> .’ And then I said, ‘Well, then, you should even write the paper!’ I said, ‘All right, I will do, hopefully that they will pay me so that my wife will be very happy about it! <i>[laughter]</i>
05:19	So this is how I came here to this conference—but not only to listen to what <i>you</i> say about me, but also to impose you to listen what I have to tell <i>you</i> from Sarajevo as a Muslim and Bosnian Muslim.
05:40	Now, we are good and bad guys. We have ugly and nice faces. Depends what you want to see. If you want to see an ugly face, you can find it, in Muslims. If Muslims want to find ugly face in the West, they can find a lot of them. But if you want to look at the nice face, of course you can find.

06:06	Now, I don't know how I look to you, but I know that my wife told me once that she likes me! <i>[laughter]</i> But I hope to tell you that there is something that you have to take into consideration: that there are some Muslims who are not violent. My people—and we are in Europe not from yesterday: last year we celebrated 470 years of our tradition in Bosnia-Herzegovina—my people on 11 July suffered genocide because Europeans and the West failed to protect my Bosnian Muslims—8,000 people in Srebrenica and Potocari. This is your face as well, not only mine. And if you don't believe me, please come.
06:59	But let me tell you: after date on agreement, which is twelve years, you did not have one single incident of revenge of the Srebrenica people and the families who lost 200 relatives of their families. So please give us some credit for doing a good job in Bosnia. But instead we hear very often that somehow Bosnia is included in so-called 'global terrorism' because some people in Belgrade don't know how to justify, but to say: 'Because you are all fighting Islamic terrorists, you know these are terrorists too.' See, it's very easy to persuade now people that, because you are Muslim, you are a terrorist.
07:50	So I came to this conference just to tell you. So when you talk and think about Islam and Muslims, don't generalise. Try to be objective—just as it is good for you, for us, and this is good for Europe. This is good for Europe, for my country, for Bosnia. We will continue not to make any revenge, hopefully that we will get some credit.
08:14	And let me now say my group statement. I hope that my time starts now, <i>[laughter]</i> Mr Chairman! <i>[Five minutes]</i> Okay, five minutes, all right! That's very good. You see, I get support!
08:32	Okay, let me now read. It's going to be very, very quick.
08:37	Our discussions centred around a meeting on the meaning and role of religion for radicalisation in general, for specifically the justification of violence. The participants have come up with a number of important questions around the issue, the core question being: 'What role does religion play in the radicalisation of people?' I think this was the task that we had to do.
09:07	And by extension, assuming that religion does form a crucial part in the psychological and social constitution of human beings, how does it strengthen or moderate tendencies towards radicalisation? Throughout the discussion, three central themes have come out of that. First, justice and violence—particularly the issue of violence is at the centre of the question how we judge the utilisation of religion either as 'use' positive sense or 'abuse' negative sense. Religion almost always is not the reason for violence itself, but it often provides a seemingly conclusive narrative for the justification of resorting to violence; and the radicalisation process appears to require a backdrop of political grievances, which are often unconnected to religion <i>per se</i> .

10:06	The perception and interpretation of truth and justice, and the violence of these notions, appears to be a central factor in the radicalisation process an individual goes through, and eventually perceives the resort to violence as the most viable option left in furthering their goals. Specifically looking at Muslims: they often feel that they are unable to tell their story. Muslims also often perceive international institutions as being unjust towards them. There is a sense of victimisation among Muslims. Participants largely agree that any religion can carry either a message of peace and moderation or a message of conflict and war—that at least goes for the Abrahamic religions.
10:52	Having said this, arguments have been made that certain religious traditions may actually exclude the resort to violence measures—Buddhism, Falun Gong, Quakers etc. As our discussions have shown, their definition of the term `violence' itself is a matter of contention.
11:13	Second theme: religion and culture. Cultural connotations do matter. Culture provides the tools for the interpretation of religion. Violence takes place between religions as well as within certain religious belief systems. Therefore there seems to be no direct, conclusive, convincing connection between a particular religion and radicalisation towards violent behaviour.
11:36	Third theme: morality and faith. Religions fulfil certain psychological and social needs, which render them useful as an ordering principle in societies. On the other hand, morality does not necessarily need religion. Acting morally means to intervene in the cycle of violence and contra-violence. However, religion as a guiding system of moral behaviour can stop people from reacting to violence with more violence. Two evils do not make up one good.
12:13	Despite some differences in opinions that surfaced in our group, there is one overall conclusion that we can probably draw from our deliberations. We believe that the way out of radicalisation is dialogue between distinguished experts as we have seen in our working group, but also between representatives of different religions.
12:35	Yesterday afternoon I took the opportunity to meet the Archbishop of Canterbury, while I apologised for handing over the chair to our working group on such short notice—many thanks to Mr James Kidner for helping out. I also felt that this was, in a sense, the practical extension of the theoretical groundwork that this conference has prepared. So I had yesterday a theoretical and practical exercise of religious dialogue. I hope you approve that!
13:12	I would like to thank you, all the members of my group, who are theologians, former government figures like Sadig Al Mahdi, and many others, who did enlighten me a lot. So I tried to enlighten them too—I hope we succeed all.

13:29 And finally, I would like to tell you that this reporter would not be like as clear as it is if it were not for our reporter, [Malte Rojinsky?]. So I want to thank him a lot. Thank you very much for listening! *[applause]*

13:45

**End of (1) Mustafa Cerić, Grand Mufti, Bosnia-Herzegovina**

(2) Olivier Roy, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique  
“Radicalisation and Deradicalisation”

14:10	Thank you very much. The debate on radicalisation, of course, was based on what are the routes of radicalisation? And here the group split into—I would say, not two groups, but two poles of analysis, with some people in between the two poles. So I will present the two positions, because there is no consensus on that. And my position is with the second one, but I will begin with the other members of the group.
14:41	For some people in the group, some experts, al-Qaeda is an ideological organisation with a strategy essentially based on establishing some sort of a [supremist?] all-Islamic state, at least in the Middle East. For this option there is a continuity between al-Qaeda and, I would say, all the history of radicalisation in the Muslim world. And hence ideologies like, for instance, [Side Cordeba, Buchs, all hitting of?] Ayman al-Zawahiri play a leading role in the mobilisation of militants for al-Qaeda.
15:26	So the [Date?] organisation, they stress the continuity with other radical Islamic movement and they stress the ideological and the political dimension of al-Qaeda. Hence Middle East is at the core of any policy of deradicalisation: diffusing the conflict, changing societies, and pushing Muslim community leaders to take a more active role in diffusing radical Islam and activism.
16:01	The second pole considers that al-Qaeda is not in the same line with the other Islamist organisations; that there is a clear break with the Islam nationalist movement—which may be radical, you know, in their tactics: like Hamas, Hezbollah and so on—but which has a territorial and a nationalist perception: Islam nationalism, if I can say that.
16:30	Al-Qaeda is more a deterritorialised organisation which recruits more on the basis of deculturalisation and disenfranchisement of youth. So it's largely based on generational [?].
16:50	In this sense, you know, there is clear discontinuity with the conflict in the Middle East. The favourite jihad of al-Qaeda have never been really in the Middle East; it was Afghanistan, Czechnia, Bosnia, Kashmir and so on. The map of recruitments of al-Qaeda doesn't fit with the maps of the Middle East armed conflicts; al-Qaeda recruits more amongst the young generation Muslim in Europe, for instance, or people from countries which are not occupied or under direct foreign encroachment.
17:25	And we used to stress also the role of the converts. Al-Qaeda has a very high percentage of converts with responsibility in the organisation. For the whole of the converts, it's for me a sign of the deculturalised dimension of al-Qaeda.

17:45 So what does al-Qaeda provide, for me? That's all that's my position. I'm sorry for the other members of the panel, but they could explain themselves! It's more a narrative than an ideology. And the tactic to counter al-Qaeda should not be, for me, based on the change of policy anywhere. Change of policy could be a good thing, but it's not linked directly with radicalisation. It's in breaking the narrative of heroism, which attracts young individuals, who find in al-Qaeda a way to combine anti-imperialism, revolt against the established order, and also a search for a positive self-image, even if it's through death.

18:30 And I will just end on that. I have a paper. But there is an interesting mistake in my paper: the organisers, rightly, corrected the English of the paper—and I thank them for that—but they also slightly altered one of my ideas. They said: that 'we should speak of a dialogue of cultures'. No, I think we should *not* speak of a dialogue of cultures, you know! Because, by speaking of a dialogue of culture, we give to al-Qaeda the main point: there are two different cultures. And religion and cultures are definitively linked.

19:04 I think, on the contrary, that we should delink religion and culture and start to replace clash of civilisation with dialogue of civilisation. Thank you very much.  
*[applause]*

**End of (2) Olivier Roy, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique**

(3) Yezid Sayigh, King's College London  
"Negotiations in Peace Processes"

19:31	Well, we had a rich and stimulating discussion, but obviously I'm going to have to do some violence, for a group that was about non-violence, to the discussion in giving you what I see as the salient conclusions that emerged from the discussion. These will reflect in my view a majority opinion within the group, not a consensus. Having said that, I'll then simply give you what I see as the foremost features and conclusions.
20:00	We avoided a semantic debate about radicals versus terrorists, and so on. Nonetheless, it's my feeling that our discussions revealed that all the sorts of issues and concerns raised—about who to negotiate with/who not to negotiate with, etc.—were no different than the same sets of concerns and questions that would arise in any conflict resolution or negotiation situation conventionally with any other non-state actor in past conflicts. So there's nothing that is essentially or fundamentally new about what we face today that fundamentally and essentially alters how we approach negotiations, and the cost benefit calculation involved. I mean, fundamentally all the questions are the same.
20:42	Furthermore, it was also clear from our discussions that a lot of the issues, the questions, the dilemmas, apply very broadly. This is not just about Islam or Islamic terrorism; it's about Sri Lanka or Ireland or Colombia—all these contexts offer fundamentally the same sets of challenges and issues and same dilemmas.
21:05	Now, the main questions, in my view, that emerged from this were: Can we talk to <i>anyone</i> ; is anyone legitimately to be involved in negotiations? What role do preconditions play; indeed, <i>should</i> there be preconditions? And, thirdly, how does the complex and fragmented nature of the politics involved in conflict—and therefore also in conflict resolution and negotiating a way out of conflict—how does this factor into coalition-building, into factionalisation, into the fragmentation of both the target group and our own side, into various ways that may be helpful or, on the contrary, impede negotiation and peace processes? And so these seemed to be the three predominant issues to think about.
21:51	First, should we seek to draw in <i>any</i> group into a negotiation process so long as it is willing and interested to negotiate; or do we draw a line somewhere and say certain types of groups guilty of certain types of violent behaviour are beyond negotiation, full stop, no matter what the circumstance and condition?
22:13	Secondly, should non-state violent actors be excluded until they have accepted certain preconditions; or does this simply give other actors in the process veto power, and therefore complicate movement into a peace process?

22:29	Thirdly, the obvious dilemma: by talking to any groups or particular groups, do we in effect legitimise them, at least within their own constituency? Do we therefore strengthen particular hard-line factions, more radical factions, against other, possibly more moderate, factions or rivals within their broad movement or community? This is the key dilemma, really: do we shift the balance in our favour by talking to people, or do we actually make it even harder for ourselves and strengthen the other side and therefore extend the conflict?
23:00	So, in terms of drawing out some conclusions from the discussion in response to these three main questions, as always the key issue seems to be just how and where to draw up the balance sheet of costs and benefits; where to draw the dividing line. This is what divides people on the same side, both in the target group, in effect, where moderates and hard-liners within <i>any</i> group will start to divide over where exactly they're going to get more benefits versus incur more costs from pursuing a particular course of action. But this is also where we need to remember that the 'we' here has to be thought about: who are 'we', what are our interests, our assumptions, our biases? And to remember that we too split along moderate/extremist lines. Maybe 'extremist' is too harsh, possibly, but nonetheless often mediators/interveners themselves, bring their own political agendas as well as their own cultural and other biases, and may in very fundamental ways complicate conflicts and complicate conflict resolution processes by bringing their own agendas, and therefore complicate the local processes.
24:07	So in general, in terms of who to talk to, we came up with an interesting distinction—a very helpful one, in my view—between talking and negotiating. We should be able to, or willing to, talk to <i>anyone</i> . That's not the same thing as negotiating with anyone. So we should be able to talk. And this is partly because refusal even to talk to anyone is in effect a total delegitimation, derecognition of their very existence or their agenda. The fact that they have a voice of some sort, however violent or terrible it might be, but nonetheless this in itself encourages greater radicalisation, greater polarisation. It moreover demonstrates to the other side that the monopoly on power, monopoly of force, is a key asset in all this, and therefore only increases the motivation for them to acquire a similar asset and to challenge your monopoly. And therefore, not talking <i>at all</i> , let alone negotiating, is probably a problematic and exacerbating factor.



25:08	Furthermore, on the same theme, it's very important that if we, in effect, set preconditions—which is we don't talk to particular people, or certainly we don't negotiate with them, because we don't like what they do and they have to stop doing that if we're going to consider negotiation—then, at the very least, we must make it clear what rewards or what comes on the other side if they meet the precondition. To assert preconditions that are absolutes, abstracts, are ideological, in effect, or about faith systems—which therefore go to the core of people's self-identity, self-image and self-definition. If those are set as preconditions, that is hugely complicating. But moreover, if we assert it as a precondition—with no sense of what they will get, having accepted the precondition, other than `Well, then we'll talk to you'—that is not going to be sufficient, and that will tend to push towards more hard-line positions.
26:03	Moving on to preconditions, then, since I've already been tackling them, a majority, at least, feeling was that preconditions obviously are problematic, for the reasons I've already explained, but trying to avoid preconditions is not to exclude <i>conditionality</i> ; it's just that conditionality needs to be built into the system, but it can be built in over successive stages of a process rather than being set up as an entry point and as a high threshold. That seems to be more problematic than establishing that there is conditionality.
26:38	Engagement is needed, moreover—moving on to the issue of the complexity of the politics—in order to encourage factions. We spent a lot of time on the phenomenon of factionalisation or factionalism, and that is actually important and useful to encourage factions to emerge within radical groups: because that may strengthen a moderate element; it may further narrow and neutralise or isolate the more hard-line elements.
27:02	But again, this will not work unless we are making clear that we will reward the emergence of factions or more moderate factions. We will help protect, at least in terms of political legitimacy, the emergence of alternative, more moderate voices in factions. This means we have to provide alternative channels, modalities, mechanisms for participation in politics for the factions that emerge.
27:26	And the further implication of this, therefore, is first that, in offering alternatives, we're offering alternatives to groups, factions, individuals, leaders; but, even if they refuse to take these alternatives—maybe democratic elections or democratic processes that therefore offer an alternative means for political participation—at least their constituencies will start to see that there are alternative means, and therefore may move away from those leaders or factions that retain the hard-line position.

27:55 We have to accept, however, that, in order to achieve any of this, we too have to adapt and, in effect, we too change—and our agendas change what we are, and how we do things will change, if we are to be effective. Now, here—to come up with a very final concluding comment on that—is that, although we are often clear on what the short-term costs of doing this—of talking to people, of not just imposing preconditions, of adapting and providing alternatives and rewards for moderation and for the splitting away of more moderate groups; there are short-term costs—but these are going to be less than the long-term costs, societal costs in particular, of alienating societies and social constituencies of these groups. In the longer term, bringing those societies into the framework is a far greater gain than the short-term costs of maintaining things like preconditions and ideological or perception-based limitations.

28:52 *[applause]*

**End of (3) Yezid Sayigh, King's College London**

(4) Jack DuVall, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington DC  
“Civil Resistance and Alternatives to Violent Struggle”

29:12	Thank you. Let me first just acknowledge the contributions of our working group members, who were: Dr Howard Barrell, Dr Roddy Bret, Dr Erica Chenoweth, Dr Audrey Cronin, Michael Downing, Dr Roy Eidelson, Dr Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Rudi Jafar, Dr Alan Kruger; and my colleagues from the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict: Peter Ackerman, Berel Rodal, Dr Maria Stephan and Hardy Merriman.
29:37	We decided to take as our challenge in our concluding session yesterday afternoon Dan Benjamin’s remark in one of the plenary sessions yesterday, when he asked the question: is there a strategy in the room? And then he said right after that: ‘A strategy has to counter the narrative of groups using extreme violence’ (I’m paraphrasing him.)
30:01	The core of that narrative, we felt, is that violence is either the necessary or most effective means of pursuing tangible political goals, but in fact that this isn’t true. And to see that, we felt that it’s useful to decouple—this is as a thought construct—radicalisation from political violence, since there have been radical political changes driven by non-violent struggles in non-violent revolutions.
30:33	Just what am I talking about? In fact, what do we mean by the very idea of civil resistance? It’s simply the systematic use of tactics like strikes, boycotts, protests, civil disobedience, usually through mass movements, to disrupt some system of oppression—challenging that system’s legitimacy, increasing the cost of that system’s ability to hold control, dividing and shredding the loyalty of those who enforce and support it. And this is done by mobilising broad-based coalitional movements and campaigns of ordinary people to put continuous pressure on those who hold power or are doing the oppression.
31:15	This is about what the people can do, not just elites or interveners or vanguards. And there are numerous examples of successful movements and campaigns of this type in history. The Ruhrkampf, the German resistance to the French invasion of 1923—I’m sorry, Olivier, about that! <i>[laughter]</i> Gandhi’s leadership, of course, as we know, of the Indian Independence movement. Danish and other European resistance to the Nazis of a non-violent nature in World War II. The rise of Solidarity in Poland and what it accomplished. The non-violent dimension—perhaps decisive of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. The People Power movement in the Philippines. The anti-Pinochet coalition in Chile in the 1980’s. The Velvet Revolution and the other changes in Eastern Europe in 1989-90. The transition in Mali to democracy in the 1990’s. And, more recently, the famous or infamous color revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and the beginnings of a saffron revolution in Burma.

32:17	Many of these non-violent movements succeeded failed violent struggles; had to marginalise terrorists, with whom they competed for popular support or, effectively, supplanted active armed struggles—as in India, particularly; as in Chile. In India, Gandhi’s work followed three decades in which the most visible form of opposition to British rule was terrorism. It was completely ineffectual, and Gandhi steered the Indian Independence struggle in a completely different and much more effective direction.
32:52	Now, you may object as I reviewed these campaigns and movements that these were primarily uses—when I’m speaking of the violent struggles that these non-violent movements displaced or out-competed—that these were uses primarily of insurgent or insurrectionary violence rather than terrorism. But the narratives they used in recruiting and motivating fighters were similar in terms of legitimising violence instrumentally.
33:20	And that leads me to the recommendations which our working group formed for action. These would be recommendations for actions by governments, by international institutions, by non-governmental organisations, and also by the news media. And these eight recommendations are in two groups.
33:37	<b>The first group is recommendations</b> for action that would inhibit the adoption of and the recruitment for violent struggle as a means of fighting oppression. That claim, by the way, is embedded—that we are against local oppressors or even global oppressors—in almost all of the statements as an example coming from Zawahiri as well as bin Laden in al-Qaeda.
34:04	□ First recommendation: <i>Discredit the discourse that justifies violence as effective.</i> Dr Chenoweth and Dr Stephan have done research on 285 violent and non-violent campaigns in the 20 <sup>th</sup> century, and they found that of the violent campaigns 28% could be said to be successful in some way; but of the non-violent campaigns 55% could have been seen as successful—more than double the rate of success for non-violent campaigns as violent campaigns.
33:41	□ Second recommendation in this group: <i>Publicly dramatise the cost to innocent non-combatants of extreme violence among those people supposedly represented by those violent groups.</i> Show that these violent groups are toxic to life in societies where they have sympathisers on the street.
35:03	□ Thirdly: <i>Significantly increase personal sanctions against the ruling groups of any regime or government that finances, harbours or supplies groups using extreme violence.</i>
35:17	□ And fourthly: <i>Discredit the belief that force asymmetry between oppressors and their challengers necessitates extreme violence</i> by showing that mass mobilisation has overcome that same kind of asymmetry in many more kinds of circumstances than has the use of extreme violence.

35:39	<p><b>The second set of recommendations</b> has to do with facilitating the choice of civil resistance in essentially all political oppressor-challenging struggles. Again, seeing the problem as the struggles, that exhibit themselves in order to attract support, as challenging an oppressor. Four recommendations there:</p>
36:02	<p>□ The first one: <i>Assist capacity-building in the strategic and tactical performance by actors who have adopted non-violent strategies for taking power.</i> Essentially, tell these groups: ‘We’ll give you the knowledge and the tools you need to be better strategic and tactical performers, but we will not tell you what your goal should be. That’s up to you.’</p>
36:27	<p>□ Secondly: <i>Teach the narrative</i> everywhere that the same supposed payoffs for participating personally in a violent struggle are available to you for participating in a non-violent struggle. Gaining personal power, overcoming humiliation, belonging to a cosmic cause, becoming a warrior—all those experiences are delivered by fighting in a civilian-based resistance movement. By the way, if you don’t believe that, just pick up the documentary outside called ‘<i>Bringing Down a Dictator</i>’ about how young people helped to power the movement against Milosevic in Serbia in 2000.</p>
37:08	<p>□ Thirdly: <i>Significantly increase sanctions on repressive state actors to quicken the creation of space for civic resistance in those countries</i>, which can develop even more robust models of non-violent change in authoritarian and in repressive societies —the conditions inside which are part of the advertisement for joining terrorist groups.</p>
37:32	<p>□ Fourthly: <i>Challenge in a serious way the international news media to dramatically increase coverage of courageous civil resisters whose endurance and persistence are unmatched in fighting for their rights.</i></p>
35:49	<p>And it’s interesting to note in considering all these recommendations that they come learning from a wealth of successful examples of the use of non-violent civic resistance in the most existential conflicts. And in 50, for example, of the 67 transitions from authoritarianism to democracy between 1970 and 2005, non-violent civic force was the pivotal factor. If this were known everywhere, the choice of political violence would be seen in its reality: as unnecessary, as largely unsuccessful, and therefore indeed as unholy.</p>
36:31	<p>Thank you. <i>[applause]</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>End of (4) Jack DuVall, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington DC</b></p>	

Addressing Radicalisation and Political Violence:  
Conclusions of Seven Expert Groups (contd)

(5) Anatol Lieven: King's College London  
"The Economics of Radicalisation"

01:27 Now, the topic of this group was the economics of radicalisation. We all agreed that there are indeed strong links between economic conditions, radicalisation and violence. We also, however, all agreed that these links are not straightforward and that poverty alone is a wholly insufficient explanation for radicalisation.

01:47 There were a number of different points on which there was a general consensus among us. The first is the importance of lack of jobs, especially in the context of the youth bulge, which is affecting or is going to affect many of the countries of most concern to us.

02:05 This refers to an absolute lack of jobs—which, God knows, applies in a great many countries; but just as importantly, a lack of jobs which correspond to people's perceived status—in other words, people can't get jobs which correspond to what they think ought to be their status in society. This particularly applies, of course, to graduates: there is probably no more dangerous political animal in the world, both in the days of communism and today, than an unemployed graduate—and there are a lot of them about! *[laughter]* This raises questions about our own strategy in Pakistan, for example, of trying to boost the education system. Yes, we need to do that, but it's a question of what kind of education. And the point was made that we need, above all, to produce skills which will be useful and *usable* in the economy concerned.

02:59 I say that as a BA in History and a PhD in Political Science—neither of which qualifications would help me to mend a car or operate a tractor or develop an artesian well! An element of self-criticism there.

03:22 In that context of the dangers of unemployed graduates, the point was made that it has been in general—and, once again, this applies not just to Islamism today but to many revolutions of the past—not the very poor, but the middle and lower-middle classes, who generally staff radical movements. Middle and lower-middle classes, either who feel permanently frustrated by their lack of status and their lack of jobs, or in accordance with the Jacov theory, which many of you may be acquainted with, have had steadily rising expectations, and steadily rising conditions, over a long period, which then come to a fairly sudden stop.

04:06	So we agreed that status anxiety is critical. What we also agreed on was the importance of a real and visible measure of the distribution of the proceeds of economic growth. As we learnt from Iran many years ago, even very, very steep economic growth can actually be politically disastrous if it is overwhelmingly concentrated in the upper classes, in a narrow section of the population. Even if the mass of the population is rising, tremendous resentments will be created. If the mass of the population isn't rising at all, those resentments may very easily lead to extreme radicalisation.
04:52	That, by the way, is a comment not just on parts of the Muslim world but a potential comment on some of our own systems in future. It's very important that the mass of the population be seen to benefit from economic growth. I think everyone in the room was pretty critical of the ideological principles of the Washington consensus that we followed for so many years in the 1990's.
05:27	All that said—and this point has already been made—a critical question is how absolute or relative economic and status deprivation and anxiety is framed ideologically and in terms of narrative. It's perfectly obvious that by no means every country, including in the Muslim world, where these problems apply, has in fact seen a major turn in a radical direction. It is also, of course, a question of the presence of political forces, of organised groups which can exploit such anxieties, and of a political culture in the society concerned, which tends to push people to make the adoption of violent measures more likely.
06:03	Finally, of course, there generally has to be some kind of catalyst to propel people in this direction. An obvious one in the case of Pakistan today is the Western military presence in Afghanistan.
05:17	Linked to all these issues is the question of marginalisation, which we also all agreed as a very important factor, particularly in Europe. And an important distinction was drawn there in terms of the marginalisation, or the perceived marginalisation, of Muslim communities between Western Europe and the United States and Canada. In Western Europe, of course, there is by no means absolute poverty of a kind which we see in so many other places, but there is a very strong perception in the various varied Muslim communities in different countries that they have been marginalised by the dominant forces within those societies. And, of course, Islamist radical groups purport to offer a solution for that marginalisation by integrating people into the heart of the Ummah, the Muslim world as a whole, through their ideology.
07:21	For terrorism, still more for insurgency, violent groups need access to sufficient funding, of course—whether it's international financing, generally from the Middle East; local voluntary contributions; the drugs trade; or forms of protection rackets, extortion and robbery. Because there are such a range of ways for extremist groups to raise money, we have to recognise that there is also no simple and straightforward way of cutting off financial support. If a local group is strong enough and has sufficient support in the population, it probably will find a way to raise enough money to keep going.

08:03	That was the easy bit; then we got on to what to do! As I say, we all rejected not just the Washington consensus to which I've referred, but also the very idea of a universal detailed model which can be applied to all the countries which may be of concern to us.
08:28	We also all agreed in principle, on the basis of what I've said before, that international aid should be geared as far as possible not just to stimulating growth but to spreading employment, diversifying the economy and building up the middle classes and the position of women in particular. Though, of course, the point was made that this has to be balanced against the threat of inflation, which can be one of the most destabilising thing that can happen.
08:57	There was a widespread feeling that, when possible, the best way to achieve these things was by encouraging the private sector in various ways—both through the improvement of micro-credit and mortgage availability, but also (and in theory, at least; well no—most importantly, the question is whether it can possibly be done) greatly improving the openness of developed markets to exports from key countries of concern. And it was said about a number of different countries that by far the best thing that we can do for them is help them to export to us—something that feeds directly into their economy and bypasses the tremendous problems, of course, of corruption that affect officialdoms in the countries concerned.
09:47	In this context, though, a very important point was made, which is that, if we really want to help these countries, very often we can't talk about <i>real</i> free trade, as we understand it, in the sense of full mutuality—they completely opening their markets as well. That is not how it was done in East Asia and South-East Asia in the Cold War. America had to accept a considerable degree of open or covert protectionism from countries like South Korea and Thailand, while keeping its own markets open.
10:23	We can't...
10:28	Two final points, one to return. No universal solutions; it's critical that we develop a really close understanding of particular countries. It was also admitted that we probably can't do that everywhere, therefore we need to concentrate on particular countries. And we need more people on the ground finding out how they work. And with an ability, therefore, not just to understand these countries economically but also to link economic programmes to an understanding of the politics, the society and the culture of these countries.



11:01	Finally, a critically important point on which we all agreed is that we should not treat all present Islamist and Islamic radical parties as if they were our permanent enemies and indistinguishable from al-Qaeda. We all agreed that we have to take the gamble that successful socio-economic change, especially if helped by Western aid and Western market openness, does stand a chance of producing positive change in these groups, along the lines of what we have seen in Turkey in recent decades, admittedly, over a considerable period of time—so we also shouldn't expect very rapid results in this regard. And that we do have a chance—and <i>they</i> have a chance, much more importantly—of changing these groups in a way that they then become much more willing to work for reform within the system, rather than trying to overthrow it by violence.
11:58	Frankly, unless we are willing and prepared to take this risk, it's probably impossible for us to help many Muslim countries at all, because—another point that came out again and again is that economic development can also strengthen radicalism, at least in the short to medium term. It does not by any means necessarily lead to secular moderation as we understand it.
12:26	Much of what I have summarised may seem rather improbable in terms of implementation by the West. It will certainly demand considerable political courage on the part of our leaders. But if these issues are <i>not</i> of vital importance to our societies, what are we doing here? And, rather more importantly, why are our soldiers dying in Afghanistan?
12:48	Thank you. <i>[applause]</i>
<b>End of (5) Anatol Lieven: King's College London</b>	

(6) Dan Benjamin: Brookings Institution and former US National Security Council,  
Washington DC  
“Security, Intelligence and Terrorist Financing”

13:00	Well, thank you very much. We had a very distinguished and thoughtful group. Most of them were Commanders of the British Empire, so it was rather difficult for me! <i>[laughter]</i>
13:33	We were discussing primarily the different instruments of tactical counter-terrorism, and I think we all agreed with the sentiment expressed yesterday on this panel by Sir Richard Dearlove that tactical counter-terrorism is important because it's one of our fundamental responsibilities to safeguard citizens, but it's also important—and has a strategic element—insofar as these groups do flourish by their violence. They are practising the propaganda of the deed, and therefore being able to frustrate them is a critical goal.
14:12	Now, not surprisingly, perhaps, there was also agreement that keeping down the violence was necessary but not sufficient. And I think the other panellists have spoken eloquently to all the other pieces of the puzzle that need to be provided.
14:33	Also perhaps not surprisingly, there was very little debate about the importance of good police work and good prosecution, good judicial work and, shall we say, the non-controversial parts of the counter-terrorism programme. I'm going to address terrorism financing first, because we had an interesting discussion on it but it wasn't quite so central to what was the main subject of exchange.
15:08	And to recap what our conclusions on terrorism financing, there was a range of opinion as to exactly how useful it is in terms of actually stopping terrorist attacks. And I think most people in the group would have agreed that we're not going to really stop the terrorist phenomenon by cutting off the funding. And we're also troubled by the fact that politicians have a habit of inflating the expectations of what will be achieved, because the instruments that are available to them most readily involve putting sanctions on individuals and groups, and therefore they tend to do that as soon as something goes bang.
15:52	But there is a great deal of utility in pursuing the money, insofar as it gives signals as to what terrorist groups may be thinking about, where they may be orienting themselves, and it also is helpful in discovering additional intelligence about terrorist organisations. It's also one of the few areas in which any kind of deterrence can be exercised in the field of terrorism: because wealthy donors make prudential calculations that suicide bombers don't, and they may have concerns about protecting their own immediate circle, their wealth, and so on and so forth.

16:39	But one agreement I should add on this is that it would be helpful, to come back to the issue of political leadership, that we start dispelling the notion that there is out there, as one participant put it, there's one Mr Big who needs to be caught and have his wallet taken away from him. Because that has propagated some misperceptions about the nature of the threat: it's actually a lot of Mr Sort Of Bigs.
17:08	Now, the more interesting part of the conversation, I think, was less in the nature of coming to a series of conclusions than of mulling over some of the problems that dog this kind of security work. And in particular it focused on the issue of, well, we have to do a lot of different things that involve secret intelligence. This immediately creates a standing problem of legitimacy, trust and credibility. And how are we going to deal with that? This is particularly acute when you add to that mix the use of force, because then you're dealing with things that societies tend to have very strong feelings about. And if you're screwing up, then you do legitimise the entire project.
18:03	In terms of the use of force itself, I would say, was fairly uncontroversial: that it is not, as we discussed yesterday also, such a great idea when you go in with three divisions to deal with a terrorist threat, in most cases. It tends to cause more problems than it solves. But the issue doesn't die there. One of the subjects we discussed—and I think there was general agreement—is that there are going to be cases in which we do need to be able to use lethal force. We need to have what was described as a sort of 'lethal but pinpoint' capability. And it seems as though we've fallen down on the job there, with most efforts in counter-terrorism in the last few years, against al-Qaeda in particular, have not been notable for having those qualities.
18:57	It becomes even more complicated because of the issue of, as mentioned before, secret intelligence. But there was a feeling that we may have that capability if we had better organisation and more will to use it, but that we would certainly need the support of our societies in deploying it.
19:16	The issue that we kept coming back to, I would say, and that dominated our discussion and that is not one that is going to have a set of simple conclusions to it was that in this world the one thing you need is legitimacy first, second and third. And we had a very thoughtful discussion about legitimacy, because it's hard to figure out how you create it and where it comes from and what constitutes it. It's one of those things that, I think we all agree, we know it when we feel it, we know it when we see it, but it's not as straightforward as it might seem.

19:53	Clearly, as one participant said, you know, having your public satisfied with the amount of blood and treasure being devoted to a certain policy is a key touchstone of legitimacy. But the matter is muddied a great deal by the problem of competence. Now, strictly speaking, competence and legitimacy are on two different tracks, but the fact is, as someone pointed out, the British police looked very, very legitimate in what they were doing until August of last year, when they killed the wrong man. And that has created a cloud over the entire project that is very difficult to dispel.
20:34	Another issue about legitimacy which was, I think, sparking a very interesting conversation but left somewhat hanging in the air is the very practical one of: are there different zones of legitimacy? I think that, at least intuitively, most of us who are sitting down would say, 'Well, you don't kidnap people off the streets of Europe. This is a zone of peace, and we don't do those things, and that delegitimizes the counter-terrorism effort.' On the other hand, I think a lot of people would agree that sending armed forces into a war zone—sending them, perhaps, political considerations aside, into an area that was infested with al-Qaeda: let's say the frontier provinces of Pakistan—would be something that is legitimate. But then there's a huge range of different modalities, different contingencies in between, and that's really a big set of issues that I don't think we as a society have a consensus on.
21:38	The example that was brought up was East Africa—you know, an area that has to various extents under- and ungoverned spaces—and how do we operate there, and what do we do to keep people from plotting and carrying out attacks that may actually come to London or Washington or wherever? And it seems to me that this is the issue that we're going to need to have a lot more discussion and finally try to come to something approaching a consensus in a democratic society, which is a very difficult thing on these kinds of issues.
22:09	And we'll leave it at that. <i>[applause]</i>
<b>End of (6) Dan Benjamin: Brookings Institution, Washington DC</b>	

(7) Nick Fielding: Sunday Times, London  
“The Role of the Media and the Internet”

22:35	Thank you. This group on the media and the internet was a very lively group that looked primarily at the internet issues, I have to say. And indeed it looked at many of the issues that were dealt with in the speech by the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, yesterday.
22:56	It was not easy to reconcile all of the opinions in the room; there are a wide variety of opinions and there were clear differences, indeed. But I think in terms of the way that we looked at in particular the violent jihadi websites, we noted their role in terms of advertisement of organisations, of recruitment, of training and of communications. Precisely who is using the sites and for what reason was a matter of much debate within this group.
23:33	We also noted that the kind of material that is now appearing on the internet is becoming much more complex, is becoming much more widespread—and, in fact, it’s also becoming much harder to monitor. In fact, we were very fortunate, for one of the sessions yesterday, to have an internet industry expert present at the meeting, who really began to put things in context when he talked of the trillions of text messages which are now in circulation and the billions of images. And he said that the industry —the net and the mobile communications industry—is growing at something in the region of 20% per month! These are enormous figures.
24:27	We noted that internet service providers do not monitor the content of the websites that they host, and that by and large they rely on court orders to force closures of any one particular offensive site. However, there was at least one person in our group who argued very forcefully that ISPs <i>will</i> close down sites on ethical grounds if approached. And he advocated that particular approach.
25:02	We recognised, really, that there were three ways of dealing with offensive jihadi websites, of disrupting the narrative, as Dan Benjamin referred to yesterday. They can be closed down. They can be monitored for intelligence reasons. Or there can be, as I’ve just referred to, a citizenship approach of concerned people pressuring ISPs to close down their sites. Another way of putting this, again made by one of the members of the group: they can be monitored, they can be used in different ways, or they can be destroyed.
25:45	We also recognised that in many cases there is no single solution.

25:53	A lot of our final session focused on what we felt was the need for much more research in this area. There are somewhere between 5-10,000 violent jihadi websites at present. Only 10% of those are what one person referred to as 'fountain sites': sites which provide the material for the other vulture sites, which reprocess it, repackage it and circulate it. So the relationship between those two kinds of websites is something which is not really very well understood. After all, we're talking about a phenomenon—the internet itself—which is a very new, very recent phenomenon.
26:39	There was a lot of debate about whether sites are actually used for terrorist plots. It's a commonplace that they are. However, a number of people in this working group questioned that and said there was no hard evidence. And, again, this prompts the question about, well, how are we going to find out the answers to these kinds of questions?
27:03	We noted also a point, in fact, referred to by Señor Calderon in his speech this morning: that governments are already beginning—I mean, well, you say already or you can say at last, whichever way you want to look at it, but they are beginning to flex their muscles over the perceived growing threat that the internet presents; and that at the same time they are extremely poor, as Señor Calderon mentioned, in terms of counter-propaganda. While they're very poor in those terms, they are much more likely to take what may be harsh legal steps to close down not just this site and that site but sectors, large parts, of the internet which they consider to be threatening. And we've seen that in terms of certain governments already around the world.
28:03	So the message, really, that came out of this work group is that it reinforced the need for much more research on the relationship between internet use and the activities of violent jihadi groups.
28:17	Thank you. <i>[applause]</i>
<b>End of (7) Nick Fielding: Sunday Times, London</b>	
<b>END OF Conclusions of Seven Expert Groups</b>	